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Management of Ethno-Cultural Diversity in Turkey: 
Europeanization of Domestic Politics and New Challenges 
 
 
 
PROF. DR. AYHAN KAYA∗ 
 
 
 
Turkey has gone through an enormous process of change in the last 
decade, especially regarding the political recognition of ethno-cultural and 
religiously diverse groups.  The term “diversity” has become one of the catch 
words of contemporary political philosophy.  Diversity, in its recent forms, 
whether cultural, political, ethnic, or religious, is a byproduct of globalization.  
Globalization has made the movements of persons or groups in the ethnoscape 
easier.  It is apparent that the management of diversity has posed a great 
challenge for nation states as well as for the international and supranational 
organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union (EU).  
 
This paper touches upon the management of ethnic diversity in both 
national and supranational levels, with particular reference to Turkey and the 
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EU.  The thesis makes a distinction between “diversity as a phenomenon” and 
“diversity as a discourse/ideology” in the Turkish context.  The paper claims 
that the state and various ethnic groups in Turkey have been inclined to 
employ the “diversity as a discourse/ideology” in the aftermath of the EU 
Helsinki Summit of 1999, in compliance with the prevailing discourse of 
“unity in diversity” within the EU circles. 
Political Philosophy of Diversity: “Unity-In-Diversity”, “Unity-Over-
Diversity”, and “Together-In-Difference” 
There are several recent political philosophers who have tried to 
provide some conceptual and philosophical tools in order to lay out a 
framework around discussions on diversity.  For instance, Will Kymlicka, a 
liberal-communitarian, attempts to combine ideas of liberal democratic 
principles as a basis for a cohesive societal structure (unity) with recognition 
of communitarian rights for cultural minorities (diversity) within the 
multinational states (Unity-in-diversity).1  Kymlicka claims that collective 
rights for minority groups do not contradict liberal notions of politics.  Rather, 
they are pivotal for enabling individual freedoms for the members of the 
minority group in question.2  
On the other hand, Brian Barry, a liberal, warns his readers about the 
cleavages springing from a multiculturalist approach on the basis that “respect 
for diversity” is expected to threaten unity, which he argues is necessary for 
promoting equal distribution among citizens.3  This is not wholly an economic 
issue, but also one of distributing equal rights.  Barry points to the negative 
consequences of Kymlicka's emphasis on ‘group rights’ when it comes to 
sectarian religious groups.4  He argues that such groups could never be 
granted group specific rights, if the (liberal) state is to remain true to its ideal 
of impartiality and neutrality.  Barry’s priorities lie at the rule of the majority 
with respect for individual rights over the principles of group-centered 
multiculturalism - in other words, a kind of unity-over-diversity. 
                                                 
1
 Kymlicka, Will. MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
MINORITY RIGHTS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
2
 Id. at 46. 
3
 Barry, Brian. CULTURE AND EQUALITY. AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF 
MULTICULTURALISM (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 
4
 Id. at 165. 
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However, Iris Marion Young, a communitarian, questions this “unity” 
as a necessary ground for a modern pluralistic society.5  Instead, she promotes 
a “politics of difference,” which aims at recognizing cultural and social 
differentiation among people in a region.  The people, then, do not necessarily 
need to share the same basic ideals; rather, they ought to focus on reaching 
agreements and coalitions for solving political problems.6  In contrast to 
notions of segregation and even ideals of assimilative integration, Young 
postulates a principle of togetherness-in-difference.7 
The positions stated above: liberal-communitarian, liberal, and 
communitarian, are the most debated political postures with regard to the 
management of cultural diversities in the context of nation-states.  However, 
there is not sufficient discussion concerning the management of cultural, 
ethnic, national, religious and civilizational diversity within the European 
Union.  There have been some recent attempts within the European Union 
Commission that aim at possible scenarios for the future.  These scenarios 
have lately become visible with the circulation of such notions as “unity-in-
diversity,” “‘Europe of regions,” “cultural diversity,” “diversity,” and 
“European citizenship.”  It should also be stated here that the EU Commission 
seems to favor a Kymlickan “unity-in-diversity” position in order to manage 
all sorts of diversities.  
Diversity as a Phenomenon, and as a Discourse in Turkey: An Ethnically 
Diverse Land  
There are two alternative ways of comprehending the notion of 
diversity in the Turkish context as well as in other contexts: diversity as a 
phenomenon, and diversity as an ideology. The former refers to the 
coexistence of different groups in a historical process, which comes into play 
either as a primordial phenomenon as in migration flows through Asia Minor, 
or as a politically generated phenomenon as in the settlement of various ethnic 
groups in Central Anatolia by the Imperial (19th Century) and the Republican 
(20th Century) settlement laws.  However, diversity as a phenomenon is not 
necessarily embraced by ruling powers; sometimes it is denied outright.  
                                                 
5
 Young, Iris Marion.  A Critique of Integration as the Remedy for Segregation, 
in D. Bell and A. Haddour (eds.), City Visions (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000), 
205-218. 
6
 Id. at 216–217. 
7
 Id. at 206. 
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The nation-building process in Turkey, starting from the beginning of 
the 20th century, has gone hand in hand with attempts to homogenize the 
nation by denying the diverse character of the Anatolian geography.  This 
process is characterized by a kind of heterophobia, resulting from a fear of 
losing the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution.  Contemporary Turkish history is the history of 
homogenization as in many other examples of nation-building.  Hence, 
diversity as a phenomenon has so far been denied in Turkey by the political 
elite.   
Nevertheless, there are recent signs of recognition of ethnic, religious 
and cultural differences by the Turkish state.  Thus, diversity as a 
discourse/ideology is gaining momentum in the last few years, distinguished 
by social and governmental attempts to join the European Union.  At first 
glance, it seems that the shift from the “nationalist homogenisation discourse” 
to “diversity discourse” results from external factors such as the EU itself.  
But, a comprehensive analysis of the issue may prompt us to reach another 
conclusion: that is, the alliance of internal and external factors.  In what 
follows, the discursive shift from homogenisation to diversity will be briefly 
displayed with the interplay of both internal and external dynamics in the 
background. 
Turkey: A Multi-Ethnic Country 
Turkey is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, hosting 
approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethnic groups, some 
of which are Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds, 
Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians, 
and others.  However, leaving aside the last decade of democratization 
attempts, the Turkish state has been far from recognizing the ethnically and 
culturally diverse nature of Turkish society since the foundation of the 
Republic in 1923.   
Ethnic groups in Turkey have been subject to homogenizing state 
policies, some of which originate from the nationalist Turkish history of 1932, 
which placed Turks at the center of world civilization.  Additionally, the Sun 
Language Theory (1936) addressing the Turkish language as the mother of all 
languages in the world, unitarian nationalist education policies (Tevhid-i 
Tedrisat Kanunu, 1924), banning the use of mother tongue and of ethnic 
minority names, discriminatory settlement policies (Đskân Kanunu, 1934) vis-
à-vis exchange populations and new migrants; discriminatory citizenship laws 
granting citizenship exclusively to Muslim origin migrants, implementing a 
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Wealth Tax in 1942, particularly to non-Muslims, and internally displaced 
people of the east and southeast of Turkey.8   
Retrospectively speaking, ethnic groups in Turkey such as Kurds, 
Circassians, Alevis, Armenians, Lazis, and Arabs have developed various 
political participation strategies vis-a-vis the legal and political structure and 
limitations.  While the Turkish Republic was being formed in the 1920s, and 
especially in the 30s, the republican political elite were highly engaged in a 
strong ideology of majority nationalism, which promoted the formation of an 
ethnically and culturally homogenous nation.  Most of the ethnic groups, then, 
preferred to incorporate themselves into this nation-state project along with 
the discourse of a homogenous Turkish nation defined by the republican elite.  
They abstained from declaring their ethnic identities in public, and thus 
considered themselves as one of the constitutive elements of the Turkish 
Republic.  The defining distinctiveness of the early periods of the Republic 
was the Turkification policies,9 which imposed the dominance of Turkishness 
and Sunni Islam as the defining elements in every walk of life, from the 
language spoken in the public spaces to citizenship, national education, trade, 
personnel regimes of public enterprises, industrial life and even settlement 
laws.   
Having an Imperial legacy, many of these new regulations and laws 
referred to a set of attempts to homogenize the entire nation without any 
tolerance for diversity and difference.  It is highly probable that the 
underestimation of ethnic diversity among the Muslim population of the 
Republic was because of the preceding Ottoman Millet system borrowed by 
the republican political elite.  As known, the Millet system of the Ottoman 
Empire was blinded to ethnic differences among Muslims.  All Muslims 
regardless of their other differences belonged to the one and same “Muslim 
nation.”10  
These kinds of assimilationist and/or exclusionist state policies 
eventually shaped the ways in which ethnic groups have developed their 
                                                 
8
 For a detailed account of those regulations and laws see Aktar, A., VARLIK 
VERGISI VE ´TÜRKLEŞTIRME´ POLITIKALARI, Istanbul: Đletişim Yayınları (2000); Bali, 
R., CUMHURIYET YILLARINDA TÜRKIYE YAHUDILERI: BIR TÜRKLEŞTIRME SERÜVENI 
(1923-1945), Istanbul: Iletişim Yayinlari (1999); and Yıldız, A., NE MUTLU TÜRKÜM 
DIYEBILENE: TÜRK ULUSAL KIMLIĞININ ETMO-SEKÜLER SINIRLARI (1919-1938), 
Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları (2001). 
9
 For further information on Turkification policies see Aktar (2000). 
10
 ‘Muslim nation’ included only the Sunnis, but not the Alevi population in 
Turkey.  
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identities and political participation strategies.  In order to survive in Anatolia, 
former generations of ethnic groups preferred to assimilate with mainstream 
political culture in Turkey, which was dominated by homogeneity, Sunni 
Islam and Turkishness.  The work of Moiz Kohen Tekinalp, a Jewish  Turkish 
nationalist, is illustrative in the sense that he pointed out the main 
incorporation strategies for non-Turkish ethnic minorities into the political 
system.  He proposed ten “commandments” to the Turkish-Jews for their 
incorporation with the Turkish nation in the nation-building process:  
1. Turkify your names;  
2. Speak Turkish;  
3. Pray in Turkish in synagogues;  
4. Turkify your schools;  
5. Send your children to Turkish schools;  
6. Get engaged in national issues;  
7. Stick together with Turks;  
8. Affiliate yourself with the community spirit;  
9. Fulfil your duties in the national economy;  
10. Be aware of your rights.11   
Although, Tekinalp’s commandments may, at first glance, seem to 
apply only to non-Muslims in Turkey, there is also strong evidence that his 
commandments may also apply to some Muslim communities, such as the 
Kurds and Circassians.12 
Although Tekinalp’s commandments may sound extreme, there is no 
doubt that several ethnic groups have suffered from obscurity, misrecognition, 
discrimination, uneven political representation and structural outsiderism.  
The dominant discourse of homogeneity has been challenged by a few major 
incidents having both internal and external sources:  
a) rising politics of identity originating from the USA in the 1970s;  
b) Kurdish nationalism, starting in the early 1980s;  
c) Alevi revivalism, gaining momentum in the 1990s; and  
d) the democratization process, stimulated by the Helsinki Summit in 
1999, declaring Turkey as a candidate country to the EU.  
 
There also may be several other minor reasons in this respect.  But, 
there is one reason worthwhile explaining: Turkey’s enthusiastic hopes and 
                                                 
11
 Landau, Jacob M. TEKINALP: BIR TÜRK YURTSEVERI (1883-1961). Istanbul: 
Đletişim Yayınları (1996). 
12
 See, Yıldız, supra at note 8. 
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efforts to integrate with the EU in accord with the Helsinki Summit.  The 
post-Helsinki period corresponds to Turkey’s willingness to go through 
certain constitutional and legal changes.  These changes also have an impact 
on the discourse developed by various ethnic, cultural, and religious groups in 
the country.  Therefore, the discursive shift from homogenization to diversity 
owes a lot to the Helsinki Summit decisions and to the democratization 
process which accelerated in the aftermath of the Summit.  The following 
section will elaborate on the Post-Helsinki process, which resulted in the 
intensification of the notion of “diversity as an discourse/ideology.” 
THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD: A MODEST TURN TOWARDS 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
Despite political, ethnic and religious predicaments in neighboring 
countries, Turkey has experienced one of the most stable periods in the 
history of the Republic.  At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, 
European heads of state for the first time offered Turkey the concrete prospect 
of full membership of the EU.  This occurred more than four decades after 
Turkey’s application for association with the European Economic 
Community, in July 1959.  The decision taken in Helsinki was in almost 
directly opposed to that taken at the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, which was 
designed to crush Turkey’s hopes for EU membership.  In the aftermath of the 
Luxembourg Summit, the public response in Turkey was immediate and 
harsh.  Popular nationalism, minority nationalism(s), kemalism, religiosity, 
occidentalism and euroscepticism all reached their peaks.  But, thanks to the 
Helsinki Summit, this destructive atmosphere in Turkey did not last long.   
The EU perspective delivered to Turkey in Helsinki owed much to the 
letter sent by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to the German chancellor, Gerhard 
Schröder, in May 1999.  The letter was crucial because in it Turkey expressed 
its willingness to undertake structural reforms in political, social and 
economic spheres in order to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria.  These 
commitments were optimistically interpreted by the political elite of EU 
member states, and particularly by the German Green Party and the Social 
Democratic Party.  The letter was sent in the immediate aftermath of the arrest 
of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in January 1999.  As one can imagine, 
the capture of Abdullah Öcalan was regarded as the end of a traumatic reign 
of terror and violence, both for the political establishment and the nation in 
general. 
It is apparent that many ethnic minority groups in western Europe 
have recently been trying to bypass their host nation states, to which they 
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have been subjected, by bringing  their grievances to EU bodies for 
resolution.  For example, Basques, Corsicans and Catalans have taken their 
demands on a transnational basis into the European Commission.  Likewise, 
Kurds, Alevis, Circassians and other ethnic minorities in Turkey are also 
engaged in similar political manoeuvres.  In fact, they have rational reasons to 
do so.   
The EU has recently declined the use of the minority discourse due to 
the escalation of minority problems in Europe, especially in the aftermath of 
the dissolution process of the former Yugoslavia.  As could be clearly seen in 
the Accession Partnership Document, which maps out the requirements of 
Turkey in the integration process into the EU, the term “minority” has been 
replaced with the term “cultural diversity” in order to celebrate “unity in 
diversity.”  Corresponding to some threats as well as to practical needs within 
the western European context, the discursive shift from “minority” to 
“cultural diversity” also has its reasons peculiar to the Turkish context in 
which the use of the term “minority” carries the risk of provoking certain 
groups in one way or another.  
Parallel with the discursive shift from “minority discourse” to ‘cultural 
diversity,” the rising currency of the understanding of the “Europe of Regions” has 
also made an impact on the management of political, economic and social disparities 
with regard to less-developed regions.  Many Kurds, for instance, are attracted by the 
notion of a “Europe of Regions,” capable of providing the context for political 
accommodation between the Turkish Republic and the Kurds.13  Similarly, other 
ethnic and/or religious groups such as the Alevis, Circassians, Georgians and Lazis 
are also captivated by the democratic quality of the EU, which denounces cultural 
homogeneity and celebrates cultural diversity.  Consequently, ethnic group 
associations in Turkey have already abandoned minority politics in the face of the 
currently changing political discourse in the West. 
There is stong evidence in Turkey that some political actors within the state 
apparatus have demonstrated their willingness toward recognizing ethnic, cultural and 
religious diversity; and that minority claims are no longer predominantly considered 
to be a threat to national security, but to be a quest for justice by at least a part of the 
political and military establishment.  This shift in the ways in which the state 
perceives minority claims has brought about essential repercussions in the public and 
the state bureaucracy. For instance, the Minorities Commission, which was secretly 
                                                 
13
 Yavuz, M. Hakan. “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in 
Turkey,” NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS, Vol. 7, No. 3 (August 2001): 1-24.  
See also, Ekinci, Tarık Ziya. AVRUPA BIRLIĞI’NDE AZINLIKLARIN KORUNMASI 
SORUNU, TÜRKIYE VE KÜRTLER. Istanbul: Sümer Yayıncılık (2001). 
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formed in 1962, was banned in 2004 and replaced with the Civil Committee on 
Minorities.  The new Committee is composed of central and local government 
representatives, but does not include any military personnel.  This discursive shift is 
also visible in the discourse of the Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, Interior 
Minister and the Chief Negotiator for the Accession Talks with the EU. 
Virtuous Circle 
The EU perspective offered in Helsinki has radically transformed the 
political establishment in Turkey, opening up new prospects for various 
ethnic, religious, social and political groups.  Kurds, Alevis, Islamists, 
Circassians, Armenians and a number of religious and ethnic groups in 
Turkey have become true advocates of the EU in a way that affirms the pillars 
of the political union as a project for peace and integration.  The EU provides 
great incentives and motivation for numerous groups in Turkey to reinforce 
their willingness to coexist in harmony.  What lies beneath this willingness no 
longer seems to be the retrospective past, full of ideological and political 
disagreements among various groups, but rather the prospective future, in 
which ethnic, religious and cultural differences are embraced in a democratic 
way.  The EU currently appears to be the major catalyst in accelerating the 
process of democratisation in Turkey.  
The conclusions of the European Council, summoned in Copenhagen 
in December 2002 states that “if, in December 2004, the European Council, 
on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, decides 
that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the European 
Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey ‘without delay’.”  
However, the political establishments and the general publics in each EU 
country are aware of the fact that Turkey’s membership in the Union will 
further stimulate discussions about “European identity” and “the limits of 
Europe.”  
There have been recent heated public debates on Turkey’s EU 
membership in several countries, mostly disfavoring membership of a large 
state like Turkey with its overwhelmingly Muslim population and socio-
economic conditions below the European average.14  Some arguments point 
out the socio-economic disparity between Turkey and the EU, some underline 
the Islamic character of Turkey, and some emphasize Turkey’s undemocratic 
                                                 
14
 Kubicek, Paul. “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and 
Opportunities,” WORLD AFFAIRS, Vol. 168, No. 2 (Fall 2005): 67-78. 
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and patrimonial political culture, whilst others even raise the clash of 
civilizations in order to reject Turkish membership.   
Nobody can deny the fact that it will be difficult for the EU to absorb 
Turkey in the short term.  However, a more constructive discourse needs to be 
generated with regard to Turkey’s full membership in order to revitalize one 
of the fundamental tenets of the EU, that of “a peace project.”  There is no 
doubt that a peace project requires constructive rather than destructive 
criticism.  The discourse developed by the Independent Commission on 
Turkey is constructive, and thus deserving of praise.  
The decision taken by the Union on 17 December 2004, and 
reconfirmed on 3 October 2005, to start accession talks with Turkey 
immediately, has also reinforced the Turkish public’s faith in the EU.  What is 
even more important in Turkey is that “the peace project” discourse has 
become quite popular and political.  One comes across articles in the 
newspapers and speeches on TV and radio that address the EU as a peace 
project that has been able to settle the deep-rooted animosity between 
Germany and France and, more recently, between Germany and Poland.  It is 
believed that the EU is not only a peace-making political union, but also one 
that exports peace.  
The 1999 Helsinki Summit decision prompted a great stream of 
reform in Turkey.  In fact, the country underwent more reform in just over 
two years than during the whole of the previous decade.  Several laws were 
immediately passed in the National Parliament to fulfil the Copenhagen 
political criteria.  These included the right to broadcast in one’s mother 
tongue; freedom of association; the limitation of military impact on the 
judiciary; more civilian control over the military; bringing extra-budgetary 
funds to which the military had access within the general budget of the 
Defence Ministry; removing military members from the High Audio Visual 
Board (RTÜK) and the Board of Higher Education (YÖK); removing military 
judges from the State Security Courts (DGM) and eventually the abolition of 
those Courts; the extension of civil rights to officially recognized minorities 
(Armenians, Jews and Greeks); reformation of the Penal Code; the abolition 
of the death penalty; release of political prisoners; the abolition of torture by 
the security forces; and greater protection for the press.  Furthermore, strict 
anti-inflationist economic policies have been successfully enforced along with 
the International Monetary Fund directives; institutional transparency and 
liberalism have been endorsed; both formal nationalism and minority 
nationalism have been precluded; and socio-economic disparities between 
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regions have also been dealt with.  However, much remains to be done and to 
be implemented.   
The EU perspective has also provided the Turkish public with an 
opportunity to come to terms with its own past, a Turkish 
“Vergangenheitsbewältigung” (coming to terms with the past).  Two widely 
debated and polemical conferences on the “Ottoman Armenians during the 
Demise of the Empire” and the “Kurdish Question” were organized at the 
Istanbul Bilgi University, on September 25-26 2005 and March 11-12 2006 
respectively, a point to which we shall return later.  Although the judiciary 
acted favorably towards the lawsuits claimed by some ultra-nationalist 
lawyers, both conferences paved the way for public discussion of two subjects 
that had hitherto been taboo in contemporary Turkish history.  
Another international conference was hosted (26-27 May 2005) by 
the Istanbul Bilgi University’s Centre for Migration Research, on the theme of 
the emigration of Assyrians who were forced to leave Eastern Anatolia in the 
aftermath of the foundation of the Republic in 1920s.  Assyrian-origin 
participants from various European countries including Sweden, Germany, 
France and Belgium openly expressed their excitement at seeing the radical 
democratic transformation that Turkey had recently gone through. Another 
conference, on the theme “Meeting in Istanbul: Past and Present,” held June 
30 – July 2, 2006, was organized by the Greek-origin minority in Istanbul, to 
bring together intellectuals from the Anatolian-Greek diaspora and the Greeks 
of Istanbul.  Apart from the fact that such conferences could be organized in 
contemporary Turkey without encountering any major public intervention, the 
latter conference was even hosted by the AKP-affiliated Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality.  All of these legal and political changes bear witness to the 
transformation of Turkey regarding its position vis-à-vis the notion of 
diversity.  This transformation corresponds to a discursive shift, which 
officially recognizes Turkey as a multicultural country. That is to say that 
multiculturalism is no longer just a phenomenon in Turkey: it is also an 
officially recognized legal and political fact.  
Vicious Circle 
From 17 December 2004 to 3 October 2005, when EU state and 
national government leaders decided to start negotiations with Turkey, 
tensions began to rise between nationalist, patriotic, statist, pro-status-quo 
groups on the one hand and pro-EU groups on the other hand.  This was the 
time when the virtuous cycle of the period between 1999 and 2005 was 
replaced with the vicious cycle starting from the late 2005.  A new nationalist 
2010] AYHAN KAYA  225 
 
 
wave embraced the country, especially among middle-class and upper middle-
class groups.  The electoral cycle of presidential and general elections, 
witnessed militarist, nationalist and Eurosceptic aspirations coupled with 
rising violence and terror in the country.   
The fight between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the 
other statist political parties, backed by the army, crystallized during the 
presidential election in May 2007.  The AKP had nominated the then Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, as presidential candidate, but Mr. Gül did 
not fit the expectations of Turkey’s traditional political and military 
establishment and he failed to reach the required two-thirds majority in the 
assembly sitting.  This failure resulted from the fact that the presidential post 
has a rather symbolic importance in Turkey since it was first occupied by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey.  However, the 
establishment argued that, as someone with pro-Islamist values and a wife 
who wears a headscarf, Mr. Gül was inappropriate for the office of president.  
The conflict even led to military intervention in politics on 27th April 2007, an 
intervention notoriously labelled “e-intervention” because of the way it was 
announced on the web page of the Chief of Staff.  However, the nationalist 
and militarist alliance against the AKP was unsuccessful in the general 
election and on 22 July 2007 the party won a landslide victory, with 47 % of 
the votes cast.  Following the elections, Abdullah Gül was also elected to the 
Presidential office.  
It could simply be concluded that, instead of heeding the nationalist 
and militarist electoral campaigns, based on a parochial, local, anti-global and 
anti-European discourse that aimed for “nationalist closure,” the Turks opted 
for Europeanization, globalization, stability and progress.  However, this time 
the EU was not in a state of being a light house for Turkey again.  This is 
why, the political divide present at the top of the Turkish State is now being 
turned into a social divide between moderate Islamists and secular 
fundamentalists, involving a wide variety of political and non-political actors 
such as the political parties, parliament, judiciary, army, academia, non-
governmental organizations, media and business circles. 
The social and political divide in Turkey has both internal and 
external sources. The divide actually seems to have economic reasons as the 
ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), has so far represented 
the interests of newly emerging middle class groups with rural origins and 
conservative backgrounds, who are competing against the established middle 
and upper middle classes with urban backgrounds.  The divide also springs 
from the fact that the legitimate political center is now accessible to several 
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social groups, including not only laicists, republicans, Kemalists and liberal 
business circles, but also Muslims, Kurds, conservative business circles and 
several other groups. International sources of the divide are namely internal 
crisis of the European Union, enlargement fatigue of the Union, ongoing 
instability in the Middle East, changing American interests in the region, the 
rise of political Islam as a reaction to the ongoing Islamophobia in the world, 
and the global evocative ascendancy of civilizationist/culturalist/religious 
discourse.  
Conclusion 
In the post-Helsinki period, the government has essentially given up 
exclusionist nationalist policies and has become rather inclined toward 
inclusionary policies vis-à-vis ethnic and religious groups.  The Helsinki 
Summit essentially refers to the acknowledgment of the notion of “diversity 
as an ideology.”  Furthermore, the Helsinki decision was very decisive in 
turning the Kurdish minority and other ethnic groups into being more 
collaborative with the Turkish political system, and in making ethnic groups 
raise their concerns to the EU delegation in search for democratization in 
many respects. These are the signs in Turkey that some political actors within 
the state apparatus have demonstrated their willingness to recognize ethnic, 
cultural and religious diversity; and that ethnic groups in general have gone 
through a discursive shift from “minority discourse” to “diversity discourse.”  
Some of the state actors and several ethnic groups have also implicitly and 
explicitly expressed their approval of the Kymlickan position of “unity-in-
diversity.”   
Thus, there seems to be a direct link between the discursive shifts of the 
European Union and those of Turkey.  Nevertheless, I should point out that, in 
this paper I have specifically discussed the Kymlickan position with respect to 
both Turkey and the EU.  The two other positions by Brian Barry and Iris 
Marion Young are also worthwhile to discuss in a greater depth as they both 
correspond to some other fault lines in the Turkish context as well as in other 
cases, such as the central and eastern European candidate countries.
